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Abstract
There is strong evidence that in bargaining situations with asymmetric
outside options people exhibit self-serving biases concerning their fairness
judgements. Moreover psychological literature suggests that this can be a
driving force of bargaining impasse. This paper extends the notion of inequity
aversion to incorporate self-serving biases due to asymmetric outside options
and analyses whether this leads to bargaining breakdown. I distinguish be-
tween sophisticated and naive agents, that is, those agents who understand
their bias and those who do not. I find that breakdown in ultimatum bar-
gaining results from naiveté of the proposers.
JEL classification: A13, C7, D63
KEYWORDS: fairness perceptions, self-serving bias, inequity aversion,
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There is a large body of experimental literature, both in psychology and eco-
nomics, that finds self-serving biases in judgements of fairness. This literature sug-
gests that self-serving biases are a driving force of bargaining impasse. It is evident
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that bargaining is important on all levels of social interaction from the small quar-
rels among friends and family to the big negotiations between states. The costs of
its impasse can be substantial, consider for example, the amounts spent privately
and publicly on civil litigation or the costs of strike and lockout. Understanding
why bargaining fails in some cases is one of the major concerns in social sciences. A
self-serving bias settles itself in a notion of fairness that, mostly unconsciously, tends
to favour the agent. It is intuitive that in a situation where agents have different no-
tions of fairness and moreover, are not aware of these differences, bargaining might
fail. In the economics literature, there has been no attempt, so far, to model self-
serving biases theoretically and to explore its impact on bargaining breakdown. This
paper tries to do this by extending the notion of inequity aversion in the presence
of asymmetric outside options and applying it to ultimatum bargaining games.
For a self-serving bias to occur, the psychological literature suggests that “there
needs to be some form of asymmetry in how the negotiation environment is viewed”,
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997, p. 119). In real life, one hardly finds a perfectly
symmetric negotiation environment. In particular, most situations are characterised
by asymmetric outside options. These occur, for example, in wage bargaining where
the employer might have the choice between several different candidates whereas
the employee’s outside option is unemployment. Yet similarly, asymmetric outside
options are present when countries negotiate emission targets of a global pollutant,
those damaging effects vary across countries. Furthermore, there is a close link
between outside options and individual wealth levels. Asymmetry in terms of out-
side options plays a prominent role and is maybe the most natural case triggering
self-serving biases. This paper therefore focuses on self-serving biases induced by
asymmetric outside options.
Economists usually analyse bargaining games with the neoclassical assumption
of purely self-interested agents. However, experimental evidence suggests that a
large fraction of agents do not behave as classical economic theory predicts. Sim-
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ple set-ups such as dictator, ultimatum or investment/ trust games, suggest that
subjects compare their payoff with the other participants’ payoffs. For an extensive
summary on the experimental findings, see chapter 2 in Camerer (2003). There exist
various approaches to model the experimental evidence. All of these models embed
social comparison processes in preferences, for an overview of the literature see Fehr
and Schmidt (2003). Here, I follow the approach of inequity aversion by Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) where agents dislike income inequity. Inequity aversion provides a
simple and sparse representation of the comparison process that nevertheless cap-
tures a lot of the experimental findings. Comparing monetary payoffs, agents base
their judgement as to whether an outcome is considered as equitable on a reference
allocation. Fehr and Schmidt argue that in a symmetric setting a natural refer-
ence outcome is one which attributes the same monetary payoff to all agents (Equal
Split). With the introduction of asymmetric outside options this reasoning is no
longer applicable. The Equal Split is just one among many other possible reference
allocations like, for example, Split the Difference which advocates an equal split of
the entire cake minus the sum of outside options. On which of the various reference
allocations an agent is likely to base her fairness judgement is an empirical question.
Yet, a self-serving bias would imply that with asymmetric outside options agents
adopt a fairness perception that favours them in monetary terms.
The extension I propose allows inequity averse agents to base their decision on
reference allocations different from the Equal Split. I render the reference allocation
of the agents linearly dependent on the difference in outside options between two
agents. The strength with which this difference influences the reference point can
vary across agents. It serves as a measure of the extent to which the fairness per-
ception favours the agent. According to Dahl and Ransom (1999, p. 703), agents
that are self-servingly biased “...subconsciously alter their fundamental views about
what is fair in a way that benefits their interests”. Hence, a self-serving bias is
characterised by two features: First, it settles itself in a notion of fairness that tends
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to favour the agent, i.e. that leaves the agent with a relatively big monetary payoff.
Second, agents are not aware of their self-serving biases. I separate the two features
of self-serving biases to analyse the influence of each component separately: An
agent is biased, if she has a reference allocation that attributes a larger allotment
to her than the reference allocation of her partner agent. To capture the second
feature of a self-serving bias, namely that people are ignorant about the partiality, I
distinguish between sophisticated agents who understand that their fairness notion
favours themselves, and naive agents who have no such understanding.
Within this extended framework of inequity aversion, I analyse ultimatum bar-
gaining. This simple bargaining game delivers the ingredients to more sophisticated
negotiation environments. It is thus interesting to understand in a first step how
self-serving biases work in this simple setting. In an ultimatum game, a proposer
and a responder bargain over the division of a fixed pie. The proposer announces a
division which the responder can accept or reject. If he accepts, the pie is divided ac-
cording to the proposed rule. If he rejects, each player gets an outside option, known
to both agents. With purely self-interested agents, as well as with standard inequity
averse agents, there will be no bargaining breakdown. With the mere introduction
of differing evaluations of what allocation is fair, this does not change. As long as
the proposer knows the fairness perception of the other agent, she prefers to offer a
share that the responder is willing to accept rather than to get her outside option.
Accordingly, as long as the biased agents are aware of their bias, agents reach an
agreement. If instead the proposer is biased and naive, then there are circumstances
where the bargain breaks down. The reasoning is straightforward. The respondent
is willing to accept any offer that is above a certain threshold. The threshold level
depends on the fairness perception of the respondent. Sophisticated and biased
proposers predict the threshold correctly, while some naive and biased proposers
underestimate it. Therefore, whenever a naive proposer offers the underestimated
threshold level in equilibrium, the bargain fails.
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Related to the present paper is Konow (2000). He presents a model that incorpo-
rates, in addition to standard material utility, a genuine value of fairness intertwined
with an incentive to change beliefs about the fairness concept. He postulates that
there is an objective fairness concept from which agents voluntary deviate to favour
themselves. In contrast, the present paper takes the belief about the fairness con-
cept as given and analyses how this belief induces bargaining breakdown. Another
related paper by Heifetz and Segev (2003) suggests that self-servingly biased agents
have entered a tough state of mind vis-a-vis someone else. Heifetz and Segev char-
acterise a class of bargaining mechanisms under which a population evolves that
exhibits some moderate degree of toughness. They identify the underlying trade-
off that toughness decreases the average probability of a bargain, but improves the
terms of trade. In contrast, this paper examines how toughness influences behaviour
on each bargaining stage. Finally, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki (2004) extend
equity aversion in a way similar to our extension. They introduce the concept of
“just deserts” in the context of dictator games with preceding production. There,
agents suffer when their inputs to the surplus are larger/ smaller than their final
shares. The dictator faces a trade-off between material payoffs, equality and just
deserts. However, their extension of inequity aversion differs substantially in that
they assume that different norms are conflicting with each other. In their model,
agents trade-off disutility from inequality with disutility from a deviation to just
deserts. Whereas the present model postulates that agents adhere to one norm
which depends on the context of the situation.
In the next section, I propose an extension of inequity aversion that incorpo-
rates heterogeneity in fairness perceptions and self-serving biases. The framework
is then applied to ultimatum bargaining games in section 2. Section 3 discusses
experimental evidence. Section 4 concludes and suggests further paths of research.
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1 An extension of inequity averse preferences
Inequity averse agents compare their monetary payoff with the payoff of members
of a specific reference group. Within this reference group they dislike outcomes that
they perceive as unequal or unfair, that is they derive negative utility of a deviation
from their reference allocation. The reference allocation of an agent with respect to
another agent is defined by the pair of payoffs that she considers to be equal or fair.
The utility of an agent depends on the reference allocation as well as the reference
group. Both these determinants are considered exogenous in the model of Fehr
and Schmidt. They argue that in an experiment all participants form the reference
group. Furthermore, they postulate that in symmetric situations a natural reference
allocation is one in which each agent gets the same payoff, the Equal Split. Other
consequentialist models like Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Charness and Rabin
(2002) also postulate the Equal Split as reference allocation. Once asymmetry is
introduced, there is no reason to believe that the Equal Split is a natural reference
allocation. The asymmetry may lead to various reference allocations. This can be
seen, for example, in an experiment by Messick and Sentis (1979) that asked for
the fair payment of different groups. One group was told that they should imagine
they had worked 7 hours and were to receive a certain amount of money for that.
Subjects of the other group were told to imagine they had worked for 10 hours on
the same task. All subjects were asked to state the fair payment for the ones that
had worked for 10 hours. There were two prominent concepts of fairness, one that
induced the same hourly wage and one that induced the same overall payment.
In simple bargaining situations such as the ultimatum game, the mere allocation
of roles introduces asymmetry that can induce a self-serving bias.1 More powerful
sources of asymmetry in bargaining environments, however, are asymmetric payoff
1Proposers view themselves in a relatively more powerful role and therefore believe that they
deserve more than their opponents. The respondents in contrast think that the distribution of
roles should not affect the division of the cake, see Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994).
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possibilities or differing outside options for the agents. The present paper models
self-serving biases due to asymmetric outside options. Different outside options are
an important source of asymmetry. They are present, for example, in situations
where an employer and a worker bargain over the worker’s wage. But there are a
lot of other day-to-day examples where people with different outside options have
to decide about the distribution of a surplus. Furthermore, there is a resemblance
between outside options and individual wealth levels in terms of their impact on fair-
ness judgements. In their fairness statements, agents can be and often are guided
by considerations concerning the difference in individual wealth levels. Even though
individual wealth levels are not “destroyed” if the parties successfully bargain with
each other, relative wealth levels might nevertheless determine the reference alloca-
tion in the bargaining situation. In this sense, part of the analysis can be transferred
to self-serving biases induced by different wealth levels. Apart from this apparent
omnipresence, asymmetric outside options are relatively easy to capture. First, it
is an easily observable characteristic of the bargaining situation. Second, it can
be measured quantitatively. Last, outside options can be altered in experimental
set-ups and thus the predictions of the theory should be testable.
An easy and straightforward way of incorporating outside options into fairness
considerations is to render the reference allocation linearly dependent on the differ-
ence in outside options. The reference allocation then has to obey
xi − xj = γi (ωi − ωj) ∀i 6= j (1)
where xi represents the monetary payoff of agent i, ωi her outside option and γi
measures the extent to which the reference allocation favours the agent. This rep-
resentation has the property that whenever we consider agents in a symmetric en-
vironment, the reference allocation is the Equal Split, independent of γi. Note that
the fairness parameter γi can vary across agents.
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Suppose two agents i, j can jointly generate a fixed surplus, which I normalise
to 1 and which is strictly larger than the sum of the outside options 1 > ωi + ωj.
The reference allocation of agent i is uniquely determined by equation (1) and the
restriction that xj = 1− xi. Denote the pair of payoffs that solves these equations
by
³
x
f
i (γi) , x
f
j (γi)
´
=
µ
1 + γi (ωi − ωj)
2
,
1− γi (ωi − ωj)
2
¶
where the superscript f stands for fair. There are several outstanding reference
allocations. The most prominent being the allocation where both agents receive
equal monetary payoffs (Equal Split). This would imply a fairness parameter γi
of zero. A reference allocation that splits the difference between the surplus both
agents can jointly generate and the sum of the outside options ωi + ωj (Split the
Difference) implies a parameter γi of one. Furthermore, a parameter of γi =
1
ωi+ωj
represents a reference allocation that divides the entire cake proportionate to the
agents’ outside options (Proportional Split). Still, one could think of any other value
of γi constituting a reference allocation. In the case where agent i has the larger
outside option, ωi > ωj, the parameter range of γi can be reduced to
h
− 1ωi−ωj ,
1
ωi−ωj
i
.
The upper value signifies a reference point where agents consider it fair that agent
i gets the entire pie and the lower value where agent j gets everything.2
Incorporating this approach in the representation of inequity aversion yields pref-
2Suppose an agent considers it to be fair that she gets the entire surplus. One could ask in
which ways this agent is different from an agent who is purely self-interested. Contrary to the pure
self-interest agent, the inequity averse agent engages in social comparison processes, regardless
of the fact that she considers it fair to receives the entire pie. Thus, she nearly always suffers
from disadvantageous inequity aversion. As a consequence, behavioural predictions are different,
in general, from the predictions derived for the self-interest agent.
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erences of the form
ui (xi, xj) = xi − αi
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
max {xj − xi − γi (ωj − ωi) , 0}
−βi
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
max {xi − xj − γi (ωi − ωj) , 0}
with αi ≥ βi ≥ 0 and βi < 1. The utility parameters αi resp. βi measure the loss
for agent i resulting from a deviation to her disadvantage resp. advantage from her
reference point.
The reference allocation of a self-servingly biased person attributes a relatively
big monetary allotment to herself. Moreover, it is often the case that the person
believes her reference allocation to be impartial. I split up the notion of self-serving
biasedness into these two components: (i) the bias itself and (ii) the belief about
the bias.
Definition 1 An agent i is self-servingly biased with respect to another agent j
if a higher monetary payoff is attributed to herself by her own reference allocation
than by the reference allocation of agent j, i.e. xfi (γi) > x
f
i
¡
γj
¢
.
This implies that the agent with the relatively high outside option is self-servingly
biased if she has a relatively large fairness parameter γi. Conversely, an agent with
the relatively small outside option is self-servingly biased if she has a relatively low
γi. Consider for example the two specific reference allocations of Equal Split and
Split the Difference. Agents are self-servingly biased if the agent with the relatively
big outside option regards Split the Difference as a fair outcome, while the agent with
the relatively small outside option considers the Equal Split fair. This relativistic
view of biasedness might sound unfamiliar. One might argue that whenever an
agent considers it to be equitable that she gets the entire surplus herself, she is
self-servingly biased. However, biasedness requires a point of comparison. There
is no such exogenous “objective” comparison available in the context of bilateral
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bargaining. Therefore, biasedness is defined here in comparison to the reference
allocation of the other agent.
To rule out cases where an agent allocates less to herself than the opponent does,
I restrict the parameter range such that
γj ∈
·
− 1
ωi − ωj
, γi
¸
for ωi ≥ ωj.
The agent with the relatively small outside option is thus bound to have a smaller
fairness parameter than her opponent.
I distinguish between those agents that are aware of differing fairness notions
among individuals and those that are not. In analogy to O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999), I call an agent naive who thinks her reference allocation is impartial. A naive
agent assumes therefore that the other agent has the same fairness parameter as
herself. In contrast, a sophisticated agent knows that her reference allocation differs
from the one of her opponents. Moreover, she knows the exact fairness parameter
of the other agents.3 Denote the belief of agent i about the fairness parameter of
agent j by bγij.
Definition 2 Agent i is naive if she believes that agent j’s fairness parameter is
the same as hers, that is bγij = γi. Agent i is sophisticated if her belief about agent
j’s fairness parameter is correct, that is bγij = γj.
In the presence of naive agents the solution concepts of subgame perfection and
Bayesian perfection become problematic as beliefs might not be correct in equilib-
rium. I therefore employ the concept of “perception perfect strategies” introduced
by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) in the context of hyperbolic discounting. This
concept merely requires that agents choose an action that maximises their payoff
3If we allow sophisticated agents to be uncertain about the exact value of the fairness parameter
of the other agent, we get partial sophistication. The case with perfect sophisticates and perfect
naives can be regarded as a benchmark.
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according to their beliefs. But it does not require, as the concept of subgame perfec-
tion or Bayesian perfection, that agents’ beliefs are correct in equilibrium. Denote
with Ui
¡
si
¡
γi, bγij¢¢ the (expected) utility of agent i resulting from the strategy
si ∈ Ai where Ai signifies the strategy space for agent i. I restrict the strategy space
to incorporate pure strategies only.
Definition 3 The strategy sppi
¡
γi, bγij¢ is perception-perfect for a ¡γi, bγij¢-agent if
and only if it is such that sppi
¡
γi, bγij¢ ∈ argmaxsi Ui ¡si ¡γi, bγij¢¢.
The belief of sophisticated agents is correct. Therefore the perception perfect
equilibrium coincides with the subgame perfect equilibrium resp. the Bayesian per-
fect equilibrium.
In the next sections, I analyse the behaviour of self-servingly biased inequity
averse agents in ultimatum bargaining games. In particular, I focus on the behaviour
of self-servingly biased agents that are naive.
2 Ultimatum game
In an ultimatum game, a proposer and a responder bargain over the division of
a fixed surplus of one.4 The proposer (P ) announces a division of the surplus
(1− s, s) where s denotes the share offered to the responder. The responder (R)
in turn accepts or rejects the proposal. If he accepts, then the surplus is divided
according to the proposed rule. If he rejects, each player gets her or his outside
option denoted by ωi ≥ 0 for i = P,R. Both agents know the outside options of
either player.
In the subgame perfect equilibrium under the assumption of purely self-interested
agents, the proposer offers a division of the surplus of (1− ωR, ωR) which is accepted
4In what follows, I denote the first player as female and the second player as male.
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by the respondent. Contrary, with inequity averse agents, the equilibrium offer
depends upon the characteristics of the utility functions of both players. With
complete information concerning the utility parameters αR and βR, proposers offer
s



= max{s, 1
2
} if βP > 12
∈
£
s,max{s, 1
2
}¤ if βP = 12
= s if βP <
1
2
where s = αR+ωR−αRmax{ωP−ωR,0}−βRmax{ωR−ωP ,0}
1+2αR . An increase in the outside option
for the responder increases the minimum share he is willing to accept. However,
an increase in the outside option of the proposer might decrease or increase the
minimum acceptable share depending on the difference in outside options of the
proposer and the responder. With the introduction of asymmetric outside options,
it might occur that the minimum offer the responder is willing to accept s exceeds
the equal share of 1
2
. This occurs if the value of the outside option to the responder
exceeds the equal share of a half. In this case, the proposer prefers to offer the
minimum offer rather than staying with her outside option, as will be shown in
section 2.2.
The focus of this paper is to study the equilibrium, and potential bargaining
breakdown in equilibrium, when the reference allocations of agents differ from the
Equal Split. In particular, I am interested in the impact of heterogeneity in reference
allocations and of ignorance concerning this heterogeneity. Before analysing the
equilibrium of the general case, I explain the workings of a self-serving bias with the
help of a simple example in the next section.
2.1 An example
Suppose the proposer has got no outside option and the responder’s outside option
is positive, ωR > ωP = 0. Consider the two conflicting reference allocations of Equal
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Split and Split the Difference. A biased proposer believes that the Equal Split
¡
1
2
, 1
2
¢
is fair, while a biased responder adopts Split the Difference
¡
1−ωR
2
, 1+ωR
2
¢
as reference
allocation. The fairness parameter of the proposer resp. the responder is γP = 0
resp. γR = 1. The mere introduction of a self-serving bias in reference allocations
does not result in a breakdown of the bargaining. A sophisticated biased proposer
is always willing to divide the pie such that the respondent is at least as well off
as with his outside option. The efficiency gain resulting from the bargain is large
enough to compensate for deviations from the reference allocation.
To see this, I compute the maximum share the proposer is willing to offer (MTO
- Maximum Tolerable Offer, denoted by s) and the minimum share the responder
is willing to accept (MAO - Minimum Acceptable Offer, denoted by s). These
shares render the proposer resp. the responder indifferent between their outside
option and the division of the pie. In our example, the value of the outside option
to the responder is uR (0, ωR) = ωR and a division (1− s, s) of the cake which
is disadvantageous to him, i.e. s ≤ 1+ωR
2
, results in a value of uR (1− s, s) =
s− αR (1− 2s+ ωR). The responder’s MAO is thus
sγR=1 =
(1 + αR)ωR + αR
1 + 2αR
.
The proposer values the outside option with uP (0, ωR) = −αPωR. She derives a
utility of uP (1− s, s) = 1− s− αP (2s− 1) of a disadvantageous division (1− s, s)
of the pie, with s ≥ 1
2
. Hence she is better off with a division of the pie as long as
the share for the respondent does not exceed the MTO of
sγP=0 =
1 + αP (1 + ωR)
1 + 2αP
.
The MTO sγP=0 is strictly bigger than the MAO sγR=1. The bargain therefore never
fails to take place. The reason being that agents also dislike inequity when they stay
with their outside options. The proposer thus suffers from inequity aversion in case
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of the breakdown of the bargain. This increases the share she is maximally willing
to give to the responder. In section 2.2, I show that this holds in general.
If, however, the proposer is biased and naive about the bias, then the bargain
is likely to fail. The naive and biased proposer thinks that the responder shares
the same reference allocation with γP = 0. She employs this fairness parameter to
compute the MAO. Hence, she believes the MAO to be the same as in the standard
case with simple inequity aversion
seγPR=0 =
(1− βR)ωR + αR
1 + 2αR
.
This level is strictly smaller than the actual MAO, i.e. sγR=1 > seγPR=0. If the
proposer’s sufferance from advantageous inequity is sufficiently small, i.e. βP <
1
2
,
then, in equilibrium, the proposer is going to propose the smallest share to the
responder. Therefore, she proposes a share that is below the minimum share the
responder is willing to accept and the bargain fails.
The next section extends this result to more general notions of fairness and
derives the equilibrium for the case of incomplete information concerning the utility
parameters αR and βR.
2.2 General case
The introduction of asymmetric outside options has several implication for the equi-
librium of the ultimatum game with inequity averse agents. On the one hand,
asymmetry in outside options can increase the MAO such that it exceeds the fair
share of the pie. On the other hand, the asymmetry might lead to a self-serving
bias.
In the framework of Fehr and Schmidt, we have already seen that in some cases,
namely when the utility of the outside option to the responder is larger than the
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utility of the fair share, the MAO exceeds the fair share. In these cases, the proposer
simply offers the MAO regardless of her level of sufferance due to advantageous in-
equity aversion. For the general case of heterogenous reference allocations, Lemma
1 shows that the responder’s MAO is larger than the share the proposer considers
to be fair for the responder if and only if the utility the responder receives from
his outside option is larger than the utility derived from the fair share. With a
self-serving bias the number of cases, where the MAO exceeds the fair share sf (γP ),
increases compared to the case where both agents share the same reference alloca-
tion. Denote the fair allocation of agent i depending on the fairness parameter γi by¡
1− sf (γi) , sf (γi)
¢
=
³
1+γi(ωP−ωR)
2
,
1−γi(ωP−ωR)
2
´
and the MAO depending on the
fairness parameter γR by s (γR).
Lemma 1 The MAO of the responder is larger than the fair share of the proposer,
s (γR) > s
f (γP ), if and only if uR (ωR, ωP ) > uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
.
Proof. The MAO s (γR) is a disadvantageous share for the responder such that
he is indifferent between the outside option and that share. It is thus determined
by uR (ωR, ωP ) = uR (s (γR) , 1− s (γR)). The responder’s utility of a share s that
is to his disadvantage is given by uR (s, 1− s) = s − αR (1− 2s− γR (ωP − ωR)),
which is strictly increasing in the share s. The fair share sf (γP ) that the pro-
poser attributes to the responder is weakly disadvantageous to the responder. If
proposer and responder share the same reference allocation, then the fair share is
not disadvantageous. Otherwise, if agents are biased, the fair share of the proposer
by definition attributes less to the responder than the fair share of the responder,
hence it is disadvantageous. Therefore,
uR (ωR, ωP )− uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
> 0
↔
¡
s (γR)− sf (γP )
¢
(1 + 2αR) > 0
↔ s (γR) > sf (γP ) .
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In case the MAO is larger than the fair share, we have to ensure that the proposer
wants to offer more than her fair share to the responder. The efficiency gain from
a bargain has to be sufficiently large as to compensate the proposer for the loss
resulting from the disadvantageous deviation from her reference allocation. Lemma
2 establishes that the proposer is better off if she offers the MAO to the responder
than if she is left with her outside option. In case the MAO exceeds the fair share,
the proposer therefore prefers to offer the MAO, than to be left with her outside
option.
Lemma 2 The MAO s (γR) of the responder is smaller than the MTO s (γP ) of the
proposer.
Proof. Suppose agents are biased such that γi ≥ 1, γj ≤ 1 for ωi > ωj. This
includes the case where each agent considers it fair that she or he gets the entire
surplus. The MTO and the MAO can then be calculated as
uP (1− s, s) = 1− s− αP (2s− 1− γP (ωR − ωP ))
= ωP − αP (1− γP ) (ωR − ωP ) = uP (ωP , ωR)
s =
αP + 1− ωP − αP (ωP − ωR)
1 + 2αP
, (2)
and
uR (s, 1− s) = s− αR (1− 2s− γR (ωP − ωR))
= ωR − αR (1− γR) (ωP − ωR) = uR (ωR, ωP )
s =
αR + ωR + αR (ωR − ωP )
1 + 2αR
. (3)
Algebraic transformations show that the MAO is smaller than the MTO if the
16
sum of the outside options is smaller than the entire pie:
s ≤ s↔ ωR + ωP ≤ 1,
see Appendix 4 for further detail.
If agents become less partial as either γi decreases or γj increases (with γi ≥ γj),
the MTO weakly increases or the MAO weakly decreases, see Appendix 4 for further
detail.
To get some intuition, consider the following example. Let the outside option of
the proposer be half the pie, ωP = 12 , while the responder has no positive outside
option, ωR = 0. Further assume that the proposer’s reference allocation is such that
she gets the entire pie and the reference allocation of the responder is the Equal Split.
Now, if the proposer suffers a lot from disadvantageous inequity, i.e. αP is very large,
one might think that he is not willing to deviate much from his reference allocation
and is willing to give only a very small amount to the responder, ε. The responder
with a high αR might prefer to stay with the outside option constellation
¡
1
2
, 0
¢
rather than accept the division (1− ε, ε) as he suffers less from inequity aversion
under the outside options. Why is this reasoning not correct? The proposer does
not only suffer from inequity aversion when the bargain takes place and she gets
less than the entire pie, but also when both agents get their outside options. In
both situations, proposers with a very high αP suffer a lot. Hence to avoid the
suffering in the outside option constellation, she is willing to propose an offer that
is substantially smaller than she thinks to be fair.
The result is robust to the following modification of the model. Suppose a
participation decision precedes the game. Participation implying that agents forego
the possibility to earn their outside option. In this version of the game, agents receive
nothing in case they do not agree on a division of the surplus, just as in the standard
case. However, the decision to pass on the outside option might still influence their
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perception of the fair allocation. If it influences the reference allocation whenever the
bargain takes place as well as when it breaks down, the above result stays valid. The
MAO could only exceed the MTO if the fair allocation depends on the difference
in outside options in case the bargain takes place, but not when it breaks down.
Hence, only when agents have different reference allocations in these two cases, the
proposer might not be willing to offer the MAO.
The following proposition characterises the equilibrium of the ultimatum bar-
gaining with sophisticated proposers, that is proposers who understand that they
are biased.
Proposition 1 In perception perfect equilibrium, if uR (ωR, ωP ) ≤
uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, a sophisticated proposer offers a share
s∗



= sf (γP ) βP >
1
2
∈
£
s (γR) , s
f (γP )
¤
βP =
1
2
= s (γR) βP <
1
2
.
Otherwise, she proposes s∗ = s (γR). The responder accepts the offer.
Proof. If uR (ωR, ωP ) ≤ uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO s (γR) is smaller
than the fair share sf (γP ). The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of
proposition 1 in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
If instead uR (ωR, ωP ) > uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO s (γR) exceeds the
fair share sf (γP ). The proposer’s utility of an offer above the fair share s ≥ sf (γP ) is
given by uP (s) = 1−s−αP (2s− 1− γP (ωR − ωP )) which is strictly decreasing in s.
The proposer therefore never offers a share bigger than the MAO. By definition, the
responder only accepts offers above the MAO. Lemma 2 shows that the proposer
always prefers to offer the MAO than to get her outside option. Therefore, in
equilibrium the proposer offers exactly the MAO.
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Proposition 1 implies that a self-serving bias as such does not generate a bar-
gaining breakdown. The proposer is always willing to render the responder at least
indifferent between his outside option and the proposed share.5 Note that the beliefs
of sophisticated agents are correct and the perception perfect equilibrium coincides
with the subgame perfect equilibrium.
To what extent do the results change if the proposer is biased and naive? Naive
agents believe that other agents share the reference allocation with them. In the
example, we have already seen that naiveté about the self-serving bias can lead to
an offer that is not acceptable for the responder. The naive proposer underestimates
the MAO. If she comes to propose the underestimated MAO in perception perfect
equilibrium, the responder rejects the offer and the bargain breaks down.
Lemma 3 states the conditions under which naive and biased proposers predict
the MAO to be strictly smaller than the actual MAO. Whether the naive proposer
accurately predicts the MAO depends crucially on whether her fairness parameter
is bigger or smaller than one. A fairness parameter of one implies the reference
allocation of Split the Difference. With Split the Difference, the agent does not
suffer from inequity in the outside option constellation. For illustrational purposes
assume that the outside option of the responder is larger than of the proposer. As
soon as the fairness parameter of the responder exceeds one, the responder suffers
from disadvantageous inequity in the outside option constellation. The responder
thus suffers in the same way from disadvantageous inequity, both, in the outside
option constellation and when he gets his MAO. Therefore his MAO is independent
of the fairness parameter as can be seen in (3). Contrary, if the fairness parameter of
the responder is below the threshold of one, the responder suffers from advantageous
inequity in the outside option constellation and from disadvantageous inequity when
5Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) propose the self-serving bias as source of bargaining impasse.
They hypothese that a self-serving bias might eliminate the contract zone, that is the set of
agreements that both sides prefer to their reservation value. The above argument shows that,
within the framework of extended inequity aversion, a self-serving bias does not eliminate the
contract zone in an ultimatum game.
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he gets his MAO. Therefore the MAO depends on the fairness parameter. A naive
proposer thinks that her fairness perception is impartial. Therefore, the predicted
MAO is independent of the fairness parameter if her fairness parameter exceeds one,
γP ≥ 1. Otherwise the prediction depends upon the particular fairness parameter
of the proposer. A wrong prediction can only occur when the proposer predicts that
the MAO depends on the fairness parameter. In case she predicts the MAO to be
independent of the parameter, we know her fairness parameter is above one. The
partiality of the agents implies that the parameter of the responder is even bigger
and therefore also bigger than one. Hence, the MAO is correctly predicted. However,
if the proposer predicts the MAO to be dependent on the fairness parameter, the
partiality implies that she underestimates the actual MAO. The following lemma
generalises this argument.
Lemma 3 A naive and biased proposer believes the MAO to be smaller than the
actual MAO, s (γP ) < s (γR) if and only if
1) ωP < ωR and γP < 1, or
2) ωP > ωR and γP > 1.
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to Appendix 4.
Given the conditions of Lemma 3, a naive and biased proposer underestimates
the MAO, i.e. s (γP ) < s (γR). Therefore, if she offers the predicted MAO in
perception perfect equilibrium, her offer is too low and is rejected by the responder.
The following proposition summarises the conditions for bargaining breakdown.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of Lemma 3, a naive and biased proposer
causes a breakdown (with positive probability) if
1) uR (ωR, ωP ) > uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
or
2) uR (ωR, ωP ) ≤ uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
and βP <
1
2
(βP =
1
2
).
Proof. In equilibrium, the respondent accepts any offer above the true MAO
s (γR). Under the conditions of Lemma 3, a naive and biased proposer predicts
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the MAO to be too small, that is s (γP ) < s (γR). If the utility of the outside
option of the responder is larger than the utility of the fair share, uR (ωR, ωP ) >
uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO s (γR) is larger than the fair share of the pro-
poser sf (γP ). In perception perfect equilibrium, the maximally offered share is
given by max
©
sf (γP ) , s (γP )
ª
, see Proposition 1. This is smaller than the actual
MAO s (γR) and the bargain breaks down.
Otherwise, if the utility of the outside option of the responder is smaller than the
utility of the fair share, uR (ωR, ωP ) < uR
¡
sf (γP ) , 1− sf (γP )
¢
, the MAO is smaller
than the fair share the proposer attributes to the responder, s (γR) ≤ sf (γP ). The
proposer offers a share s∗



= sf (γP ) if βP >
1
2
∈
£
s (γP ) , s
f (γP )
¤
if βP =
1
2
= s (γP ) if βP <
1
2
in perception perfect
equilibrium. Therefore, if the parameter of advantageous inequity is smaller than
1
2
, the equilibrium share is smaller than the minimal share and the bargain breaks
down. With a parameter βP =
1
2
, the bargain breaks down with positive probability.
Proposition 2 characterises the circumstances under which there is bargaining
breakdown with complete information concerning the parameters of the responder’s
utility function αR and βR. The analysis stresses that both characteristics of a self-
serving bias are crucial for breakdown, namely, the bias as well as the ignorance of
it.
On the one hand, the introduction of asymmetric outside options can increase
the MAO such that it exceeds the fair share of the pie, on the other, the asymme-
try might lead to a self-serving bias. There is no built-in mechanism that makes
a self-serving bias more likely if the difference in outside options becomes more
pronounced. The conditions of Lemma 3 do not get more or less restrictive if the
difference in outside options increases. We therefore do not expect more bargaining
breakdown because of self-serving biases when the difference in outside options in-
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crease. However, the increase in the difference of outside options might increase the
likelihood of the case where the MAO exceeds the fair share and through this chan-
nel the likelihood of a bargaining breakdown. However, the influence of an increase
in the difference of outside options is indeterminate and depends on the parameters
of the utility function.
So far, I analysed the perception perfect equilibrium given that the proposer
knows the willingness of the responder to deviate from his reference allocation. Now,
suppose the proposer does not know the parameters of the responder’s utility, but
believes that the parameter of disadvantageous αR and advantageous βR inequity
are distributed according to the joint cumulative distribution functions Fα,β (αR, βR)
on the support [α, α] × £β, β¤. Denote s (bγPR)max = maxαR,βR s (αR, βR|bγPR) and
s (bγPR)min = minαR,βR s (αR, βR|bγPR).
Proposition 3 With (αR, βR) ∼ Fα,β [α, α]×
£
β, β
¤
, the proposer offers
s∗ (βP ) ∈



£
sf (γP ) ,max
©
sf (γP ) , s (bγPR)maxª¤ if βP > 12£
min
©
s (bγPR)max , sf (γP )ª ,max©s (bγPR)max , sf (γP )ª¤ if βP = 12h
s (bγPR)min , s (bγPR)maxi if βP < 12
in the perception perfect equilibrium.
Proof. This follows from Propositions 1, 2 and the proof of Proposition 1 in
Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
The perception perfect equilibrium differs for sophisticated and naive proposers
in essentially two features. First, the offered shares and second, the resulting propen-
sity of bargaining breakdown. The share sophisticated proposers offer is weakly
bigger than the share offered by a naive agent. Proposers face a trade-off between
costs and the probability of acceptance. With increasing shares, the probability of
acceptance increases as well as the associated costs to the proposer. Naive proposers
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assess the reference allocation of the responder wrongly. They believe the responder
shares the reference allocation with themselves. We have seen that, under the con-
ditions of Lemma 3, this leads to a wrong prediction of the MAO in the complete
information case. For a given parameter pair (αR, βR), the prediction of the MAO
is smaller than the true MAO. This implies that the assessment of the probabil-
ity of acceptance of a share s is bigger than the actual probability. Thus, naive
proposers offer less than sophisticated proposers in perception perfect equilibrium.
Given that the share a sophisticated proposer offers exceeds the share of a naive
proposer, the probability of bargaining breakdown increases for a naive proposer.
The following proposition summarises these two characteristics of the perception
perfect equilibrium with incomplete information.
Proposition 4 With incomplete information, a naive proposer offers (weakly) less
and the probability of bargaining breakdown is (weakly) higher than with a sophisti-
cated proposer.
Proof. The maximisation problem of the proposer is characterised by
argmaxs (uP (1− s, s)− uP (ωP , ωR)) prob (s ≥ s (bγPR)) + uP (ωP , ωR). Note that
the probability is the estimated probability of acceptance of the share s. Lemma
2 tells us that the proposer is always better off proposing the MAO than with her
outside option. The difference between the utility of the bargain with share s and
the outside option is thus always positive, uP (1− s, s)−uP (ωP , ωR) ≥ 0 and weakly
decreasing in s on the interval of the equilibrium share s∗.
The maximisation problem is characterised by the trade-off between a higher
probability of acceptance and the associated costs. If the conditions of Lemma 3 are
met, the naive proposer underestimates the MAO. Thus she believes the probability
of acceptance of share s to be too high. The maximisation calculus thus results in
a lower share for these proposers.
As shown above the share of a sophisticated proposer is weakly bigger than the
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share of a naive, ss ≥ sn, where the subscripts s, n denote sophisticated and naive.
The probability of bargaining breakdown equals the probability of acceptance of a
share. Thus the probability of breakdown is smaller with a sophisticated proposer,
prob (s ≥ sn) ≥ prob (s ≥ ss).
The probability of a bargaining breakdown is higher if the proposer is naive than
if she is sophisticated. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Naive and
sophisticated proposers face uncertainty concerning the parameters that determine
the loss resulting from a deviation from the responder’s reference allocation. The
decision how much of the pie to offer to the responder is thus based on expectations.
In some cases, the proposed share is going to be too low for the responder to accept
it. This is one source of bargaining breakdown which is identical for a naive and
a sophisticated proposer. If the naive proposers share the belief about the respon-
der’s reference allocation with the sophisticated, they face the same propensity of
bargaining breakdown out of uncertainty. However, generally the naive proposers
do not share beliefs with sophisticated. Their belief about the responder’s reference
allocation is based on their own assessment of fairness. We have seen that this can
lead to an offer that is below the actual MAO in the complete information case and
a generally smaller offer than the offer of a sophisticated agent in the incomplete
information case. This is an additional source of bargaining breakdown. Conse-
quently, the probability of acceptance and therefore the probability of bargaining
breakdown is larger with naive than with sophisticated proposers.
The model predicts that asymmetry compared to symmetry in outside options
increases the probability of rejection. This contrasts with the predictions of the
theory of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), where agents, by assump-
tion, share the same reference allocation of Equal Split and thus cannot fall prey
to a self-serving bias. Fehr and Schmidt predict no difference in rejection rates
across ultimatum games with symmetric and asymmetric outside options. This dif-
ference in predictions provides a test that discriminates between the theory of Fehr
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and Schmidt that does not allow for a self-serving bias and the enriched version
presented in this model.
3 Evidence
There are some experiments on ultimatum bargaining that introduce asymmetry
in outside options. In an experiment by Knez and Camerer (1995), proposer and
responder have positive and asymmetric outside option. The proposer’s outside
option amounts to 30% of a $10-pie, while the respondents are divided into two
groups. The first half of the responders (R1) gets a smaller outside option than the
proposers, namely 20% of the pie, and the second half of the responders (R2) gets
a higher option of 40%. Offers to the responder with the small outside option are
significantly lower than to the responder with the high outside option. Moreover,
MAO of the R1 responder are significantly lower than of the R2 responder. This
impact of the outside options on offers and MAO can be explained with inequity
averse agents. Furthermore, Knez and Camerer (1995) find that rejection rates are
around 45%-48%. This is much higher than the rejection rates found for two player
ultimatum games with no outside options which are around 20%, see tables on pages
53-55 in Camerer (2003). A likely cause for the increase in the rejection rate is the
introduction of asymmetric outside options. The remaining experimental set-up is
identical to other ultimatum bargaining experiments in western countries. If agents
are inequity averse with symmetric reference allocations as postulated in Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), then rejection rates should not be influenced by the introduction of
asymmetric outside options. However, the existence of self-servingly biased agents
can account for part of the additional inefficiencies. As we have seen, naive proposers
underestimate the MAO and are thus likely to propose a share that is not acceptable
for the responder. Hence, the bargain breaks down more often than in the case where
agents are sophisticated about their bias or where they are not biased at all.
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The increase in rejection rates in Knez and Camerer could also stem from the
fact that positive outside options have been introduced rather than the attached
asymmetry. However, similarly high rejection rates are found in the ultimatum
experiments by Buchan, Croson, and Johnson (2004) and Schmitt (2004). In these
studies solely one of the two players is endowed with a positive outside option.
Both studies find that offers and MAO decrease with a higher outside option of
the proposer. Schmitt finds that rejection rates are 50% in the treatments where
proposer have the positive outside option and around 30-40% in the treatments with
positive outside options for the responders. The experiment by Buchan, Croson,
and Johnson is run in the US and Japan. For the US, the rejection rate in the
condition with a positive outside option for the proposer is significantly larger than
in the condition with no positive outside option for either player, whereas there is
no significant difference in Japan.6
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2001) present an experiment on a reduced ultima-
tum game with a positive outside option for the respondent. There the proposer
can choose between a split which gives herself 8 and the responder 12 and a split
where she gets 5 and the proposer gets 15. Whenever the responder rejects the offer,
the proposer goes home with nothing and the responder gets his outside option of
10. They argue that: “Since both offers give the responder a higher payoff than
the proposer they cannot be viewed as unfair from the responder respectively. Thus
resistance to unfairness cannot explain rejections in this game.” Using the strategy
method, they observe that 24% of the responders reject the 8/12 offer, while only
4% reject the 5/15 offer with the difference being significant at a 1%-level. They
take this result as a case for the presence of spitefulness which they define as the
willingness to sanction in order to increase the payoff difference between two agents.
However, the evidence from this experiment can also be explained by self-serving
biases in the perception of the fair allocation. If the proposer thinks that both sub-
6Buchan, Croson, and Johnson do not report rejection rates. We thus compute these for each
of their treatments using their original data set.
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jects unanimously believe that the 8/12 split is the closest to a fair outcome, she
proposes this split. But she could be coupled with a responder that is convinced that
splitting the difference between the pie and his outside option is fair and is therefore
going to reject the inequitable share of 8/12. This provides another explanation to
why the rejection of the 8/12 offer is significantly higher than the 5/15 offer. Which
of these explanations suits the case better is yet to be determined.
4 Conclusion
There is strong empirical evidence that in bargaining situations with asymmetric
outside options people exhibit self-serving biases concerning their fairness judge-
ments and that these self-serving biases are a driving force of bargaining impasse.
This paper provides a theoretical framework for analysing the behaviour of self-
servingly biased agents in simple bargaining situations. I build on the notion of
inequity aversion and extend it to incorporate self-serving biases due to asymmet-
ric outside options. I distinguish between sophisticated and naive agents, that is,
those agents who understand their partiality and those who do not. I then apply
the framework to analyse the behaviour of naive and sophisticated biased agents
in ultimatum games. For ultimatum bargaining with complete information, I find
that bargaining can only break down, if biased proposers are not aware of their
self-serving bias. In the incomplete information case, the propensity of bargaining
breakdown is higher with naive than with sophisticated agents.
So far, the framework only incorporates one prominent form of asymmetry, due
to outside options. One path of further research could be to think of incorporating
other forms of asymmetries in bargaining games that might bias the perception of
fairness, such as asymmetric payoff possibilities. Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996) have
run ultimatum experiments with asymmetric payoff possibilities. Players bargain
over the distribution of chips with different exchange rates and different information
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concerning these rates. If both players are fully informed and proposers have higher
exchange rates, conflicting fairness norms seem to develop. This is reflected in
unusually high rejection rates.
Appendix
Details to the proof of Lemma 2 Lemma 2 states that the amount the pro-
poser is maximally willing to give (MTO) exceeds the acceptance threshold of the
responder (MAO). To prove this, we have to show that even in case of the most
extreme biasedness, i.e. γi ≥ 1, γj ≤ 1 for ωi > ωj, the MAO is smaller than MTO.
Suppose γi ≥ 1, γj ≤ 1 for ωi > ωj. Then the MTO and MAO are given by (2) and
(3). The following calculations show that the MAO is smaller than the MTO:
s =
ωR + αR − αR (ωP − ωR)
(1 + 2αR)
≤ 1 + αP − ωP + αP (ωR − ωP )
(1 + 2αP )
= s
↔ ωR (1 + 2αP ) + αR (1 + 2αP )− αR (1 + 2αP ) (ωP − ωR)
≤ 1 + 2αR + αP (1 + 2αR)− ωP (1 + 2αR) + αP (1 + 2αR) (ωR − ωP )
↔ (ωR + ωP ) (1 + αR + αP ) ≤ 1 + αR + αP .
Next, I show that the MTO given by (2) is the smallest MTO and that the
MAO given by (3) is the largest MAO. Generally, the MTO is computed as
s = αP+1−ωP
1+2αP +
αP γP (ωR−ωP )
1+2αP +
αP max{(1−γP )(ωR−ωP ),0}
1+2αP +
βP max{−(1−γP )(ωR−ωP ),0}
(1+2αP ) .
The minimum of the MTO occurs at smin =



s (γP ≥ 1) if ωP > ωR
s (γP ≤ 1) else



=
αP+1−ωP+αP (ωR−ωP )
1+2αP . Similarly, the MAO can be expressed as s =
ωR+αR−αRγR(ωP−ωR)
1+2αR −
αRmax{(1−γR)(ωP−ωR),0}
1+2αR −
βRmax{(1−γR)(ωR−ωP ),0}
1+2αR . The maximum
of the MAO occurs at smax =



s (γR ≤ 1) if ωP > ωR
s (γR ≥ 1) else



= αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR .
Thus MTO exceeds the MAO. ¥
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Proof of Lemma 3 Lemma 3 establishes the conditions under which a biased and
naive proposer underestimates the MAO. The belief of the naive proposer concerning
the MAO is given by
s (γP ) =



αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR
if ωR > ωP & γP ≥ 1
or ωR < ωP & γP ≤ 1
αR+ωR+((αR+βR)γP−βR)(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR else
.
1) Suppose s (γP ) < s (γR) and neither condition 1) nor 2) are satisfied. Then, if
ωR > ωP (ωR < ωP ) the fairness parameter of the proposer is γP ≥ 1 (γP ≤ 1). As
the proposer is biased, the true fairness parameter of the responder is larger (smaller)
than the parameter of the proposer, γR > γP ≥ 1 (γR < γP ≤ 1). Thus both the
true MAO and the belief of the proposer about the MAO are independent of the
fairness parameter, s (γi) =
αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR for i = P,R. Hence the assumption
of s (γP ) < s (γR) is violated.
2) Now, suppose condition 1) (or 2)) is satisfied, ωR > ωP and γP < 1
(or ωR < ωP and γP < 1). Then the belief of the proposer is s (γP ) =
αR+ωR+((αR+βR)γP−βR)(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR and we have to show that this is smaller than the
true MAO, s (γR). As the proposer is biased, γR > γP (resp. γR < γP ). If
the true MAO is s (γR) =
αR+ωR+((αR+βR)γR−βR)(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR , then s (γR) > s (γP ) as
the MAO is increasing (decreasing) in the fairness parameter. If the true MAO is
s (γR) =
αR+ωR+αR(ωR−ωP )
1+2αR , then s (γR) > s (γP ) as γP (ωR − ωP ) < (ωR − ωP ). ¥
References
Babcock, L., and G. Loewenstein (1997): “Explaining Bargaining Impasse:
The Role of Self-Serving Biases,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1), 109—
126.
29
Bolton, G. E., and A. Ockenfels (2000): “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reci-
procity, and Competition,” American Economic Review, 90(1), 166—193.
Buchan, N. R., R. T. A. Croson, and E. J. Johnson (2004): “When Do Fair
Beliefs Influence Bargaining Behavior? Experimental Bargaining in Japan and
the United States,” Journal of Consumer Research, 31, 181—190.
Camerer, C. F. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory - Experiments in Strategic In-
teraction. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Charness, G., and M. Rabin (2002): “Understanding Social Preference with
Simple Tests,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 817—869.
Dahl, G. D., and M. R. Ransom (1999): “Does Where You Stand Depend on
Where You Sit? Tithing Donations and Self-Serving Bias,” American Economic
Review, 89, 703—727.
Falk, A., E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher (2001): “Driving Forces of Informal
Sanctions,” Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Working Paper, 59.
Fehr, E., and K. Schmidt (1999): “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and
Cooperation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817—868.
(2003): “Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic
Applications,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, ed. by M. e. A. De-
watripont, pp. 208—257. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Frohlich, N., J. Oppenheimer, and A. Kurki (2004): “Modeling Other-
Regarding Preferences and an Experimental Test,” Public Choice, 119, 91—117.
Heifetz, A., and E. Segev (2003): “The Evolutionary Role of Toughness in
Bargaining,” Tel-Aviv University.
30
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, K. Shachat, and V. Smith (1994): “Preferences,
Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 7(3), 346—380.
Kagel, J. H., C. Kim, and D. Moser (1996): “Fairness in Ultimatum Games
with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs,” Games and Economic
Behaviour, 13, 100—110.
Knez, M. J., and C. F. Camerer (1995): “Outside Options and Social Com-
parison in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments,” Games and Economic
Behavior, 10, 65—94.
Konow, J. (2000): “Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Al-
location Decisions,” American Economic Review, 90, 1072—1091.
Messick, D., and K. Sentis (1979): “Fairness and Preference,” Journal of Ex-
perimental Social Psychology, 15, 418—34.
O’Donoghue, T., and M. Rabin (1999): “Doing It Now or Later,” American
Economic Review, 89(1), 103—124.
(2001): “Choice and Procrastination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
161(1), 121—160.
Schmitt, P. M. (2004): “On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Out-
side Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games,” Experimental
Economics, 7(1), 49—73.
31
